Tuesday, August 14, 2012

Ostrom 2000 Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

Results from experimental evidence and from the field has shown that there are multiple types of individuals with different attitude towards reciprocity and cooperation. Besides rational egoist, which are the type that economist usually assume, two type of norm-using players -- conditional cooperators and willing punishers --  play an important role in the formation and maintenance of social norms.

Evolutionary theories can help explain the emergence and survival of multiple types of players, i.e. how different types of preferences evolve or adapt. Indirect evolutionary model assumes that players receive objective payoffs, but make decisions based on the transformation of these material rewards into intrinsic preferences. In this model, individuals have different predispositions and act accordingly. Those preferences can also adapt given the objective payoffs received and their intrinsic preferences.

The assumption of multiple types is vital in explaining social norms, In particular, when a player's type is common knowledge, rational egoists would not survive. In situations where a noisy signal about a player's type is available that is at least more informative than random, trustworthy types will survive as a substantial proportion of the population.


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